Europe of Sarajevo 100 years later: Was history ever on holidays? (From WWI to www. 9/11 or 11/9?)

Abstract. Some 20 years ago the genocide of worst kind was taking place just one hour flight from Brussels. That time, assassination of different kind from the one of 1914 has enveloped Sarajevo. While massive European ignorance turned Bosnia (and the Union of different peoples – Yugoslavia) into a years-long slaughterhouse, the Maastricht dream was unifying the Westphalian world of the Old continent. Today, two decades later, Atlantic Europe is a political powerhouse (with two of three European nuclear powers, and two of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, P–5), Central Europe is an economic powerhouse, Scandinavisch Europe is a bit of all that, and Eastern Europe is none of it. No wonder that as soon as serious external or inner security challenges emerge, the compounding parts of the true, historic Europe are resurfacing again. Formerly in Iraq (with the exception of France) and now with Libya, Sudan, Mali and Syria; Central Europe is hesitant to act, Atlantic Europe is eager, Scandinavian Europe is absent, Eastern Europe is bandwagoning, and Russophone Europe is opposing. Did Europe change (after its own 11/9), or it only became more itself?

Keywords: Europe, genocide, Bosnia, June–1914, unification, Westphalian Ummah, 9/11, geopolitics, civilization, Sarajevo.

Europe of June 1914 and of June 2014. Hundred years in between, two hot and one cold war. The League of Nations, Cristal Night, Eurosong and Helsinki Decalogue Coco Chanel, VW, Marshall Aid, Tito, Yuri Gagarin, Tolkien’s troll, Berlin wall and Euro-toll ideologies, purges, repeated genocides, the latest one coinciding with the Maastricht birth of the Union… a televised slaughterhouse and the Olympic city besieged for 1,000 days, just one hour flight from Brussels.

E non so più pregare
E nell’amore non so più sperare
E quell’amore non so più aspettare

Key words in 1914: jingoism, booming trade and lack of trust, assassination, imminent collision, grand war. 100 years later; Europe absorbed by the EU project, demographic and economic decline, chauvinism reloaded … Twisting between the world of (Gavrilo) PRINCIP and global village of (instant) MONETISATION (of everything and everyone)... Are our past hundred years an indication of what to expect throughout this century?! What is our roadmap?! Is it of any help to reflect on the Sarajevo event of June 28th, 1914 which has finally fractured a fragile equilibrium of La Belle Époque, and set the Old Continent (and its world) into the series of motions that lasted for almost a century, before ending with the unique unionistic form of today’s Europe?

Four men leading one man bound
One man whom the four men hound
One man counted bound and led
One man whom the four men dread

The following lines are not a comprehensive account on all of the events. Rather interpretative by its nature, this is a modest reminder of what Europe used and still tends to be, despite all our passions and hopes, visions and targets, institutions and instruments.

1 Taken from the lyrics of Miss Sarajevo, the song written by Bono Vox of U–2 and Luciano Pavarotti, and performed together with Brian Eno (1994). This instant radio-hit was inspired by the true events, when Sarajevens – as a form of urban protest to the world indifferent to their suffering – organized the Miss of Besieged Sarajevo beauty contest only few hundred meters from the battlefield lines. Translated from Italian, this line states: “...And I don’t know how to pray anymore / and in love I don’t know how to hope anymore / and for that love I don’t know how to wait anymore…”

2 Mak – Mehmedalija Dizdar, Bosnian poet of the modern generation. The quotation is actually an ending part of his poem: “A Note about the Five” (trans. Francis R. Jones), from his “Stone Sleeper” poetry collection (1966–71) Sijetlost, Sarajevo.
Is the EU a post-Westphalian conglomerate and post-Metternich concert of different Europes, the world’s last cosmopolitan enjoying its postmodern holiday from history? Is that possibly the lost Atlantida or mythical Arcadia—a Hegelian end of history world? Thus, should this OZ be a mix of the locally domesticated Marx-Engels grand utopia and Kennedy’s world? Or, is it maybe as Charles Kupchan calls it a ‘postmodern imperium’ (exhorting its well-off status are just)? Or, is it maybe as Charles Kupchan calls it a ‘postmodern imperium’ (exhorting its well-off status quo by notoriously exporting its transformative powers of free trade dogma and human rights stigma—a modified continuation of colonial legacy when the European conquerors, with fire and sword, spread commerce, Christianity and civilisation overseas), a kind of ‘new Byzantium’, or is that more of a Richard Young’s declining, unreformed and rigid Rome? Hence, is this a post-Hobbesian (yet, not quite a Kantian) world, in which the letzte Mensch expelled Übermensch? Could it be as one old graffito in Prague implies: EU=SU? Does the EU-ization of Europe equals to a restoration of the universalistic world of Rome’s Papacy? Is the Union a Leonard’s runner of the 21st century, or is it perhaps Kagan’s ‘Venus’—gloomy and opaque world, warmer but equally distant and unforeseen like ‘Mars’?

Is this Brussels-headquartered construct, the 20th century’s version of Zollverein with standardized tariffs and trade, but of an autonomous fiscal policy and politics? Thus, is the EU a political and economic re-approachement of sovereign states or maybe just another enterprise of the borderless financial capital? Ergo, would that be a pure construct of financial oligarchy whose invisible hand tacitly corrupted the Maastricht Treaty as to web-up a borderless, limitless, wireless and careless power hub, while at the same time entrenching, silencing and rarefying labour within each nation state?

Is this a supersized Switzerland (ruled by the cacophony of many languages and enveloped in egotism of its self-centered people), with the cantons (MS, Council of EU) still far more powerful than the central government (the EU Parliament, Brussels’ Commission, ECI), while Swiss themselves—although in the geographic heart of that Union—stubbornly continue to defy any membership. Does it really matter (and if so, to what extent) that Niall Ferguson wonders: “...the EU lacks a common language, a common postal system, a common soccer team (Britain as well, rem. A.B.) even a standard electric socket...”? Kissinger himself was allegedly looking for a phone number of Europe, too. Baron Ridley portrayed the Union as a Fourth Reich, not only dominated by Germany, but also institutionally Germanized. Another conservative Briton, Larry Siedentop, remarked in his Democracy in Europe that it is actually France who is running the EU ‘show’, in the typical French way—less than accountable bureaucracy that prevents any evolution of the European into an American-style United States. Thus, Siedentop’s EU is more of a Third Bonapartist Empire than possibly a Fourth German Reich. The Heartland or Rimland?

After all, is the Union yet another virtue out of necessity, as Brzezinski claimed, that after centuries of colonial overstretch and of mutual destructions (between protagonists in close geographic proximity), Eu-

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Enveloped in its own myopia of economic egoism, Europe – Classic division on north and south in the European news-
ethic, linguistic, religious, and behavioristic other-
ess. If this statement holds the truth, then we refer
to events before and after the Thirty Years’ War in general
and to the post-Napoleonic Europe in particular. Political
landscape of today’s Europe had been actually conceived in the late 14th century, gradually evolving to its present shape. The universalistic world of the Holy
Roman Empire and Papacy is steadily contested by the explicit confrontational or implicitly dismissive polit-
ical entities, be it ideologically (the Thirty Years’ War culminating with the Peace of Westphalia) or geo-
politically (Grand Discoveries and the shift of the gravity center westwards). The early round of colonizers, the two Iberian empires of Spain and Portugal, are the first entities that emerged, followed by France, Holland,
England and Denmark. (Belgium too, although it appeared as a buffer zone at first – being a strategic depth,
a continental prolongation of England for containment of Central Europeans, Dutch and Scandinavians from the open sea, while later on also becoming a strategic depth of France for balancing Britain and containment of Denmark and Prussia.)

Engulfed with the quest of the brewing French revolu-
tion for the creation of a nation state, these colonizers,
all of them situated on the Atlantic flank of Europe, have successfully adjusted to the nation-state concept. Im-
portantly, the very process of creation/formation of the nation-state has been conducted primarily on linguistic
grounds since religious grounds were historically defeat-
ted once and for all by the Westphalia: All peoples talking
the same language, all competing for a nation state, all of them situated on the Atlantic flank of
Europe, the so-called old colonizers on the Atlantic flank of Europe, notably for Portugal, Spain, France,
England, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

Although geopolitically defeated and ideologically conta-
ined by the Vienna Congress and its instrument: the Holy Alliance of Eastern Conservative Courts, the
very idea of a nation-state remained appealing. Once the revolutionary 1848 ousted the principal guardian
of feudalism in Europe, Metternich, the suppressed concept got further impetus. And, the revolutionary romance went on... Hence, the very creation of central European nation-states was actually enhanced by Napoleon III. The unification of Italophones was his, nearly obsessive, inten-tional deed (as he grew up in Nice with Italian Carbonari revolutionists who were fighting papal and Habsburg’s control over the northern portions of today’s Italy). Conversely, the very unification of Germanophones under the Greater Prussia was his non-intentional mis-chief, with the two subsequently emerging ‘by-products’; modern Austria (German-speaking core assembled on the ruins of mighty multinational and multi-linguistic empire) and modern Turkey (Turkophone core on the ruins of mighty multi-racial and multi-linguistic empire).

Despite being geographically in the heart of Europe, Switzerland remained a remarkably stable buffer zone: Highly militarized but defensive and obsessively neutral, economically omnipresent yet financially secretive, it represents one confederated state of two confronting versions of western Christianity, of three ethnicities and of four languages. Absent from most of the modern European politico-military events – Switzerland in short – is terra incognita.

Historically speaking, the process of Christianization of Europe used as the justification tool to pacify the invading tribes, that demolished the Roman Empire and brought to an end the Antique age, was running parallel on two tracks. One of them was conducted by the Roman Curia/Vatican and its hammer: the Holy Roman Empire. The second was run by the cluster of Rusophone Slavic Kaganates, who receiving (the orthodox or true/authentic, so-called Eastern version of) Christianity from Byzantium, and past its collapse, have taken over a mission of Christianization, while
forming its first state of Kiev Russia (and thereafter, its first historic empire). So, to the eastern edge of Europe, Russophones have lived in an intact world of universalism for centuries: one empire, one Tsar, one religion and one language.12

Everything in between Central Europe and Russia is Eastern Europe, rather a historic novelty on the political map of Europe. Very formation of the Atlantic Europe’s present shape dates back to 14th–15th century, of Central Europe to the mid-late 19th century, while a contemporary Eastern Europe only started emerging between the end of WWI and the collapse of the Soviet

12 Annotated from one of my earlier writings, it states as following: "...Early Russian state has ever since expanded north/ northeast and eastward, reaching the physical limits of its outreach by crossing the Bering straits (and the sale of Russian Alaska to the USA in 1867). By the late 17th and early 18th century, Russia had begun to draw systematically into European politico-military theatre. (...) In the meantime, Europe’s universalistic empire dissolved. It was contested by the challengers (like the Richelieu’s France and others–geopolitical, or the Lutheran/Protestant – ideological), and fragmented into the cluster of confronted monarchies, desperately trying to achieve an equilibrium through dynamic balancing. To this similar political process will affect Russian universal empire only by late 20th century, following the Soviet dissolution. (...) Not fully accepted into the European collectice system before the Metternich’s Holy Alliance, even had its access into the post-Versailles system denied, Russia was still not ignored like other peripheral European power. The Ottomans, conversely, were negated from all of the security systems until the very creation of the NATO (Republic of Turkey). Through the pre-emptive division of Poland in the eve of WWII, and successful campaigns elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Russia kept both its territory and its influence westwards. (...) An early Soviet period of Russia was characterized by isolated bilateral agreements, e.g. with Germans, Finns, Japanese, etc. The post WWII days have brought the regional collective system of Warsaw Pact into existence, as to maintain the communist gains in Europe and to effectively oppose geopolitically and ideologically the similar US-led block. Besides Nixon’s reapproachment towards China, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the final stage in the progressive fragmentation of the vast Sino-Soviet Communist block (that dominated the Euroasian land mass with its massive size and centrality), letting Russia emerge as the successor. The sudden Soviet break-up, however, was followed by the cultural shock and civil disorder, painful economic crisis and rapidly widening disparities, as well as the humiliating wars in Caucasus and elsewhere, since the centrifugal and centrifugal forces of integration or fragmentations came into the oscillatory play. Between 1989 and 1991, communist rule ended in country after country and the Warsaw Pact officially dissolved. Subsequently, the Gorbachev-Jeltsin Russia experienced the greatest geopolitical contraction of any major power in the modern era and one of the fastest ever in history. Still, Gorbachev-Jeltsin tandem managed to (re-)brand themselves domestically and internationally – each got its own label of vodka..." (Verticalization of Historical Experiences: Europe’s and Asia’s Security Structures – Structural Similarities and Differences, Crossroads – the Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal, 4 (1), page 111–112, M-MFA 2008)

Union – meaning, less than 100 years, in best cases. No wonder that the dominant political culture of the Eastern Europeans resonates residual fears and reflects deeply insecure small nations. Captive and restive, these are short in territorial depth, in demographic projection, in natural resources and in a direct access to open (warm) seas, after all, short in historic-cultural verticals and in a bigger picture-driven long-term policies. They are exercising the nationhood and sovereignty from quite a recently. Therefore, they are often dismissive, hectic and suspectful, nearly neuralgic and xenophobic, with frequent overtones. The creation of a nation-state (on linguistic grounds) in the Atlantic, Scandinavian and Central Europe was relatively a success-story. However, in Eastern Europe it repeatedly suffered setbacks, culminating in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, but also evident in the central or Baltic part of Eastern Europe.13

Keeping the center soft

Ever since Westphalia, Europe maintained the inner balance of powers by keeping its core section soft. Peripheral powers like England, France, Denmark, (Sweden and Poland being later replaced by) Prussia, the Ottomans, Habsburgs and Russia have pressed and kept the center of continental Europe as their playground. At the same time, they kept extending their possessions overseas or, like Russia and the Ottomans, over the land corridors deeper into Asia and MENA proper.14 Once Royal Italy and Imperial Germany had appeared, the geographic core ‘hardened’ and for the first time started to politico-militarily press onto peripheries. This new geopolitical reality caused a big security dilemma lasting from the 1814 Vienna congress up to Potsdam conference of 1945, being re-actualized again with the Berlin Wall destruction: How many Germanies and Italies should Europe have to preserve its inner balance and peace?15 As the late-comers the Cen-
tral Europeans have faced the overseas world, clearly divided into spheres of influence.

In very simplified terms, we can say that from the perspective of European belligerent parties, both world wars were fought between the forces of status quo and the challengers to this status quo. The final epilogue in both wars was that Atlantic Europe has managed to divert the attention of Central Europeans from itself and its vast overseas possessions onto Eastern Europe, and finally towards Russia. Just to give the most illustrative of many examples; the Imperial post-Bismarck Germany has carefully planned and ambitiously grouped its troops on the border with France. After the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo (28 June 1914), Europe was technically having a casus belli – as the subsequent mutually declared war between all parties quickly followed this assassination episode and the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. However, the first armed engagement was not taking place on the southeastern front, as expected – between the Eastern belligerent parties such as Austria, Serbia, Russia, the Ottomans, Greece, Bulgaria, etc. The first military operations of WWI were actually taking place in the opposite, northwest corner of Europe and only months later. It was in German penetration of Belgian Ardennes. Still, the very epilogue of la Grande Guerra was such that a single significant territorial gain of Germany was achieved only in Eastern Europe. Despite a colossal 4-years long military effort, the German western border remained nearly unchanged.

The end of WWI did not bring much change. The accords de paix – Versailles treaty was an Anglo-French triumph. These principal Treaty powers, meaning: Atlantic Europe, invited Germany to finally join the League of Nations in 1926, based on the 1925 Treaty of Locarno. By the letter of this treaty, Germany obliged itself to fully respect its frontiers with Belgium and France (plus demilitarized zone along the Rhine) with the unspecified promise to arbitrate before pursuing any change of its borders with Czechoslovakia and Poland. The same modus operandi applied to the Austrian borders with Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Locarno accord actually instrumentalized two sorts of boundaries around Central Europe (Germany–Austria): strict, inviolable ones towards Atlantic Europe; but semipermeable and soft towards Eastern Europe. That is how the predominant player from Central Europe, Germany, was accepted to the League, a collective system which the Soviet Russia (meaning: Rusophone Europe) was admitted to only a decade later (1934). Soon after, this double standard sealed-off a faith of many in Europe and beyond.

In fact, the 1930s were full of public admirations of and frequent official visits to an Austrian-born Hitler. It was not only reserved for the British royal family (e.g. Edward VIII), but for many more prominent's from both sides of the Atlantic. By 1938 in Munich, this 'spirit of Locarno' has been confirmed in practice when French President Daladier and British PM Chamberlain (Atlantic Europe) jointly paid a visit to Germany and gave concessions – practically a free hand – to Hitler and Mussolini (Central Europe) on gains in Eastern Europe. Neither Atlantic Europe objected to the pre-Munich solidification of Central Europe: Hitler–Mussolini pact and absorption of Austria, following a massive domestic Austrian support to Nazism of its 890,000 members of the Nazi party as well as a huge ring of sympathizers. By brokering the Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression deal between Berlin and Moscow, but only a year after the Munich-shame – in 1939 (including the stipulations on Finland, Baltic states and Poland), Stalin desperately tried to preempt the imminent: A horror of an uncontrolled expansion of Central onto Eastern Europe and closer to Russia, something that was already largely blessed and encouraged by Atlantic Europe.

16 Why did the US join up Atlantic Europe against Central Europe in both WWs? Simply, siding up with Central Europe would have meant politico-military elimination of Atlantic Europe once and for all. In such an event the US would have faced a single European confrontation-potent block to engage with sooner or later, and would have lost an interfering possibility of remaining the perfect balancer. The very same balancer role, the US inherited from the declining Britain.

17 V.I. Lenin leaves Switzerland in April 1917, and is heading to Russia by train (in the sealed off wagon) crossing all over Germany – a self-telling episode of the WWI.

18 Farce or not, history nearly repeated itself to the last detail in early 1990s. The western frontiers of Central Europe remained intact, while the dramatic change took place to its East. Besides Anschluss of Eastern Germany by the Western one, borders there remained the same, but many former neighbors have one by one disappeared for good from the political map.

19 The Cold War era has prevented any comprehensive scientific consensus. The unbiased, de-ideologized and objective view on the WWII was systematically discouraged. Soviets consistently equated Nazism and imperialism while the US, for its part, equat-ed fascism and communism. Until this very day, we do not have a full accord on causes and consequences of events in years before, during and after the WWII.

20 We should keep in mind that for the very objective of lebensraum policy (character and size of space needed for Germanophones to unhindered, live and prosper), the Jews, Roma and behavioristic minorities were the non-territorial obstacle. How-
Political science

Small wonder, that in 1945, when Russians – suffering over 20 millions of mostly civilian casualties and by far the heaviest continental burden of the war against Nazism – arrived on wings of their tanks and ideology to Central Europe, they decided to stay. Extending their strategic depth westwards–southwestwards, and fortifying their presence in the heart of Europe,²² was morally the time of the young Bolshevik Russia that saturated the country (bringing the unbearable levels of starvation and hunger up to cases of cannibalism), took away 5 million mostly civilian lives, and set the stage for ‘red terror’.

For some 300 years, Russia and the Ottomans have fought series of bitter wars over the control of the Black Sea plateau and Caucasus – sectors, which both sides (especially the Ottomans) have considered as geopolitically pivotal for their existence. Still, neither party has ever progressed at the battlefield as to seriously jeopardize the very existence of the other. However, Russia has experienced such moves several times from within Europe. Three of them were critical for the very survival of Russia and the forth was rather instructive: the Napoleonic wars, Hitler’s Drang nach Osten, the so-called “contra-revolutionary” intervention,²¹ and finally the brief but deeply humiliating war with Poland (1919–21).

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ever, Slavs and their respective Slavic states in Eastern Europe were the prime territorial target of Hitler-led Central Europe’s ‘final solution’. Therefore, no wonder why so much fifth column among Slavs. For the speeding and smoothening of the lebensraum objective, Quisling was needed as PM in Norway, but Slavic quisling-elites in each and every of that time major Slavic state – useful idiots in Poland, in Ukraine, in Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria, etc.).

²¹ The 6-year-long insurgencies (largely financed and inspired by Western Europe as an overt ‘regime change’ intervention) at

²² With the politico-military settlement of the Teheran and Yalta Conference (1943), and finally by the accord of the Potsdam Conference (1945), the US, UK and the SU unanimously agreed to reduce the size of Germany by 25% (comparable to its size of 1937), to recreate Austria, and to divide both of them on four occupation zones. The European sections of the Soviet borders were extended westwards (as far as to Kaliningrad), and Poland was compensated by territorial gains in former Eastern Prussia/Germany. The pre-WWII inclusion of the three Baltic republics into the Soviet Union was unanimously confirmed by the Americans and Britons in Potsdam, too. Practically, Russians managed to eliminate Germany from Eastern Europe (and of its access to central and eastern portions of Baltic, too), and to place it closer to the Atlantic Europe’s proper.
an occupation. Still, it was geopolitically the single option left, which Stalin as a ruthless person but an excellent geo-strategist perfectly understood. Just a quick look at the geographic map of Europe would show that the low-laying areas of western Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe are practically non-fortifiable and indefensible. Their topography exposes the metropolitan area and city of Moscow to an extreme vulnerability. So, the geostrategic dictum is that in absence of any deep canyon, serious ridge or mountain chain, the only protection is either a huge standing army (expensive and badly needed in other corners of this vast country) and/or an extension of the strategic depth.

In a nutshell, we can say that the very epilogue of both WWs in Europe was a defeat of Central Europe (challenger of status quo) against Atlantic Europe (status quo defender), with the relatively absent, neutral Scandinavian Europe, of Eastern Europe being more an object than a subject of these mega-confrontations, and finally with a variable success of Russia.

Finally, back to Franco-German re-approachment: This is far more than just a story about the two countries signing d’accord. It truly marked a final decisive reconciliation of two Europes, the Atlantic and Central one. The status quo Europe has won on the continent but has soon lost its overseas colonies. Once realizing it, the road for ‘unification’ of the equally weakened protagonists in a close proximity was wide open. This is the full meaning of the 1961Elysée.

Europe of Genocide and of Unification – Happy EU to You!

The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a loss of the historical empire for Russia, but also a loss of geopolitical importance of nonaligned, world-wide respected

23 Nowadays, from the safe time-distance, it is easy to claim that the portion of Europe under Americans was of considerably better fortune than a part under the Soviet influence. Interestingly enough, the opposite situation was elsewhere: India – Pakistan, Vietnam – the Philippines, Cuba – Colombia, Egypt – Saudi Arabia, Ghana – Liberia. That means that the intra-European differences are beyond pure American–Russian influences, and therefore far more significant. Proof? The standard-of-living difference between London and Bucharest or Paris and Sofia today is of the same—or even wider – distance than it was some 40 years ago.
Yugoslavia, which shortly after burned itself in series of brutal genocidal, civil war-like ethnic cleansings. The idea of different nations living together and communicating in different languages in a (con-)federal structure was (though imperfect) a reality in Yugoslavia, but also a declared dream of the Maastricht Europe. Moreover, this country was the only truly emancipated and independent political entity of Eastern Europe and one of the very few in a whole of the Old Continent. Despite the post-Cold War, often pre-paid, rhetorics that Eastern Europe rebelled against the Soviet domination in order to associate itself with the West, the reality was very different. Nagy’s Hungary of 1956, Dubček’s Czechoslovakia of 1968 and (pre-)Jeruzelski Poland of 1981 dreamt and fought to join a liberal Yugoslavia, and its internationally declared 3^rd way!

By 1989–90, this country still represented a hope of full emancipation and real freedom for many in the East. How did the newly created EU (Atlantic-Central Europe axis) react? At least tolerating (if not eager to support), or actively eliminating the third way of Yugoslavia?

By 1989–90, this country still represented a hope of full emancipation and real freedom for many in the East. How did the newly created EU (Atlantic-Central Europe axis) react? At least tolerating (if not eager to support), or actively eliminating the third way of Yugoslavia? It responded to the Soviet collapse in the best fashion of a classic, historical nation-state, with the cold calculi of geopolitical consideration deprived of any ideological constrains. It easily abandoned altruism of its own idea by withdrawing its support to the reformist government of Yugoslavia and basically sealed-off its faith. Intentionally or not, indecisive and contradictory political messages of the Maastricht-time EU – from the explicite encouragement of separatism, and then back to the full reconfirmation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia – were bringing this multinational Slavic state into schizophrenic situation. Consequently, these Europe’s mixed political messages –most observes would agree– directly accelerated inner confrontations of the Yugoslav peoples. Soon after, Atlantic-Central Europe axis contained the western Balkans, letting the slaughter-house to last essentially unchecked for years. At the same time, it busily mobilized all resources needed to extend its own strategic depth eastwards (later formalized by the so-called enlargements of 1995, of 2004, of 2007 and finally of 2013). This is the only answer how can genocide and the EU enlargement go hand in hand at the same time on such a small continent.

As said, the latest loss of Russophone Europe in its geopolitical and ideological confrontation with the West meant colossal changes in Eastern Europe. We may take a look into geopolitical surrounding of at the time largest eastern European state, Poland, as an illustration of how dramatic was it. All three land neighbors

24 Yugoslavia was by many facets a unique European country: No history of aggression towards its neighbors, with the high toleration of otherness. Yugoslav peoples were one of the rare Europeans who resolutely stood up against fascism, fighting it in a full-scale combat and finally paying it with 12% of its population in the 4-years war. (Relative to the 1939 size of state territory and incumbent population within, the top WWII fatalities were suffered by Poland – 18%, the Soviet Union – 15%, Yugoslavia 12%, III Reich/Germany – 10%. For the sake of comparison, the Atlantic rim suffered as follows: France – 1.3%, UK –0.8%, the US – 0.3%) Yugoslavs also firmly opposed Stalinism right after the WWII. Bismarck of southern Slavs – Tito doctrinated the so-called active peaceful coexistence after the 1955 Bandung south-south conference, and assembled the non-Aligned movement (NAM) in its founding, Belgrade conference of 1961. Steadily for decades, the NAM and Yugoslavia have been directly tranquilizing the mega confrontation of two superpowers and satellites grouped around them (and balancing their irresponsible calamities all over the globe). In Europe, the continent of the sharpest ideological divide, with practically two halves militarily confronting each other all over the core sectors of the continent, and with its southern flank of Portugal, Spain and Greece (and Turkey sporadically) run by the military Juntas, Yugoslavia was remarkably mild island of stability; moderation and wisdom. Domestically, Yugoslavia had a unique constitutional setup of a strictly decentralized federation. Although being a formal democracy in its political life, many aspects of its social and economic practices as well as largely enjoyed personal freedoms and liberties featured the real democracy. The concept of self-management (along with the Self-managing Interest Community model) in economic, social, linguistic and cultural affairs gained a lot of external attention and admiration in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Still, there was neither enough sympathies nor mercy in the towards-EU-heading Europe, to save either the Yugoslav people from an immense suffering or the symbol that this country represented domestically and internationally.

25 The brief but bloody 1989 televised episode of a witch-hunt, followed by the hasty extrajudicial and savage killing of Romanian president and his wife Ceausescu, shocked the world – but not for long. The first ever fully televised war with its highly disturbing pictures of genocidal Armageddon came by early 1990s. It remained on TV sets for years all over Europe, especially to its East. Although the Atlantic-Central Europe axis kept repeating we do not know who is shooting whom in this powder keg and it is too early to judge, this –seemingly indecisive, wait-and-see, attitude- was in fact an undeniably clear message to everyone in Eastern Europe: No III way will be permitted. East was simply expected to bandwagon – to passively comply, not to actively engage itself.

26 Ethnically, linguistically and religiously one of the most homogenous countries of Europe, Poland in its post-communist concepts reinigorates the faith (as being, past the days of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, massively de-Slavicized). No wonder as the Polish-born Karol Józef Wojtyła served the Roman Curia as Pontifex Maximus from 1978, to be replaced by the German-born Joseph Ratzinger in 2005. Prizing Roman-Catholicism over ethnicitiy, even harshly denouncing any Slavic sentiment as a dangerous roter russischer Panslawismus, ‘fortress’ Poland effectively isolates itself on a long-run as none of its neighbors is Catholic. To the contrary, the four fifths of its land-borders are shared with other Slavic states. To externally mobilize, the elites (in any East-
bors of Poland; Eastern Germany (as the only country
to join the EU without any accession procedure, but by
pure act of Anschluss), Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union have disappeared overnight. At present, Polish
border countries are a two-decade-old novelty on the
European political map. Further on, if we wish to com-
pare the number of dissolutions of states worldwide
over the last 50 years, the Old continent suffered as
many as all other continents combined: American con-
tinent – none, Asia – one (Indonesia/ East Timor), Af-
rica – two (Sudan/South Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea),
and Europe – three.

Interestingly, each and every dissolution in Europe
was primarily related to Slavs (Slavic peo-ple) living
in multiethnic and multi-linguistic (not in the Atlantic
Europe’s conscripted pure single-nation) state. Further
on, all three – meaning, every second dissolution in the
world – were situated exclusively and only in Eastern
Europe. That region has witnessed a total dissolution of
Czechoslovakia (western Slavs) and Yugoslavia (sou-
thern Slavs, in 3 waves), while one state disappeared
from Eastern Europe (DDR) as to strengthen and en-
large the front of Central Europe (Western Germany).
Finally, countless centripetal turbulences severely af-
fected Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the
SU (eastern Slavs) on its frontiers.

Irredentism in the UK, Spain, Belgium, France and
Italy, or Denmark (over Faroe Islands and Greenland)
is far elder, stronger and deeper. However, the disso-
lutions in Eastern Europe took place irreversibly and
overnight, while Atlantic Europe still remained intact,
with Central Europe even enlarging territorially and
expanding economically.

As early as in XVI century, the Easter European
thought – in the person of famous Sarajevan, Bosnian
Machiavelli, Kafija Pruščak – is spelling a universal and
far reaching wisdom that progress is both the focus of
a vision and attainable reality for all.27 If this futuris-
tic assertion is still accurate, than the progress itself
is unthinkable without social cohesion. That would,
consequently, necessitate shared interest which only
comes with thorough debates affecting all segments of
society (or at least its major interest groups). Is today’s
Eastern Europe a clas-sic case of indirect rule? Is it a
deep imperial periphery of nominally independent na-
tive rulers, while in reality the true power holder re-
sides outside, although is domestically suppor-ted by
a dense web of NGOs, multinational corporations and
locally handpicked ‘elites’?

Accidentally or not, for the last 25 years, our re-
porting on Eastern Europe was rather a matter of
faith than a reflection of the empirical reality. This
‘rhetoric’ was dominated by fragmented intellec-
tual trends that are more cultural (e.g. poetry, paint-
ings, film, etc.) than coherently economic and geo-
political in focus as they should be. How one defines
a challenge largely determines the response – effectively
points out Brzezinski. Hence, the arts will always elabo-
rate on emotions and the science will look for the facts.
If the front of Atlantic-Central Europe lately suffered
(an economic) problem which has been diagnosed as a
distributional and compositional, than who and when
is holistically and scientifically to examine the Eastern-
Rusophone Europe and its burning geo-economic (dis-
tributional, compositional), socio-political/ideological
(space-time in history) and geopolitical (logical and
areal) problem? There is a lot of (pre-paid and post-
paid) attention-diverting and velvet-silencing, but
besides this cacophonic noise where is a serious re-
search on that? If the equality of outcome (income) was
a communist egalitarian dogma, is the belief in equality
of opportunity a tangible reality offered to Eastern Eu-
rope or just a deceiving utopia sold to the conquered,
plundered, ridiculed and cannibalized countries in
transition?

By contrasting and comparing available HDI data
(UN DP’s Human Development Index) and all relevant
WB, OECD, UNCTAD, ILO and WHO socio-economic
and health indexes including the demographic trends
of last two decades, we can easily spot a considerable
economic and socio-human growth in Asia, in Latin
America and elsewhere. The only trend of negative
growth (including the suicide and functional illiteracy
figures) comparable by its duration and severity to
this of Eastern Europe, is situated in (the central-west,
central to Horn/central-east portions of) sub-Saharan
Africa. Euphemisms such as countries in transition or
new Europe cannot hide a disconsolate fact that East-
ern Europe has been treated as defeated belligerent,
as spoils of war which the West won in its war against
communist Russia.28

27 Taken from Kafija Pruščak, H. (1596), Universal theory of the
global governing wisdoms (Usul Al-hikam fi nizami-el-alem, org.
Temelji mudrosto i uredjenju svijeta). At the time, he was nick-
named in Western Europe as the Oriental Machiavelli.

28 A sharp drop in LE (life expectancy) in Russia, from age 72 to
59, is something faced only by nations at war. The evidence that
Russia has suffered such a steep decline, unreversed ever since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, is unprecedented in a peace-time
history of any industrialized nation. Although not so alarming
like in the post-Soviet Russia, the rest of post-Soviet republics and
It concludes that (self-)fragmented, de-industrialized, rapidly aged and depopulated, (and de-Slavicized) Eastern Europe is probably the least influential region of the world – one of the very few underachievers. Obediently submissive and therefore, rigid in dynamic environment of the promising 21st century, Eastern Europeans are among last remaining passive down-loaders and slow-receivers on the otherwise blossoming stage of the world’s creativity, politics and economy.  

Eastern Europe closely follow the same LA pattern—not to mention devastating birth rates, brain drain and other demographic data. E.g. the projected LA of the today’s born Berliner is around 100 years, while of Muscovite is only 67 years. Simply, the East is unable to (re-)produce its own life (or, once conceived, to keep the best of it at home).

With some exceptions of Visegrád countries (such as Poland or Czech Republic, and lately Hungary) sporadically opposing a constant bandwagoning (but even that only in the domain of narrow EU fiscal or economic matters), Eastern Europe of today is unable to conceive and effectively promulgate a self-emancipating, balanced and multivector foreign policy. Fergusson goes as far as to claim for Eastern Europeans that: “they looked at Brussels (of NATO) the way former British colonies obeyed everything said and done in London.”

East does not exercise its political sovereignty (gone with the EU), its military sovereignty (gone with the NATO), its economic and monetary sovereignty (gone with the massive domestic de-industrialization ‘preached’ by the IMF, EBRD, EIB and eventually ECB).
and its financial sovereignty (gone by full penetration of German, Austrian and Swedish banks). Most of the Eastern European states do not control a single commercial bank on their territory. Additionally, this region does not effectively control its media space – media there (of too-often dubious orientation and ownership) is discouraging, disorienting and silencing any sense of national pride, influence over destiny direction and to it related calls for self-(re) assessment. East is sharply aged and depopulated – the worst of its kind ever – which in return will make any future prospect of a full and decisive generational interval simply impossible.  

According to findings of the Budapest Institute of Economics (Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary), for the past two decades, the volume of Austrian banking sector has increased 370%–all that in the country of a flat domestic economic and negative demographic growth. This covert occupation of south-eastern Europe by the foreign financial sector did not create new jobs or re-create any industrial base there. As we can conclude aftermath, it was only meant to dry-out the remaining liquid assets (and private savings) from the rapidly pauperized, defeated belligerent. In 1914, Austria controlled banks as well; in Croatia, Bosnia, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, southern Poland and western Ukraine. However, at that time, it also had a strict governing obligation as all of them were a part of the Monarchy. By having recognized the formal sovereignty to each of these entities, Austria today (like Sweden towards the three Baltic States in the northeast flank of Europe, and Germany in the central sector of Eastern Europe) has no governing obligations whatsoever. It can easily externally socialize (externalize) all its costs including banking risks, and individualize all profits (internalize), yielding it only for itself. Hence, the EU accession criteria, combined with a nominal independence of Eastern European entities (pacified by the pre-paid media and guided by the post-paid ‘elites’), means that the economic and other assets are syphoned out, but the countries have to take a burden of the post-paid ‘elites’), means that the economic and other assets are syphoned out, but the countries have to take a burden of the state maintenance solely on themselves.

Current labor relations in the most of Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, too) resembles pictures of the 18th rather than of the 21st century’s conditions, especially in the private sector of employment. It is all with a weak or even totally absent trade unionism, dismal labor rights and poor protection of other essential social rights. “We have stringent labor conditions to the unbearable maximum, so that the few self-styled ‘top managers’ can play golf more frequently and for a longer time…how can you possibly build any social cohesion when disproportionately many suffer for the dubious benefit of the asocial, predatory few…” – confessed to me the Ambassador of one of the largest Eastern European countries who served as a mayor of his country’s capital, before his ambassadorship in Vienna.

Some ten years ago, for the special OSCE forum for demographics, I warned: “…lasting political, social and economic changes including very important technological breakthroughs – throughout our history – primarily occurred at generational intervals. This was an engine of our evolution…Presently, with demographically collapsing East European societies (natality rates, generational and brain drain), the young cohort will never constitute more than a tiny minority – in the sea of aged, backward-looking, psychologically defeatistic and biologically incapable, conservative status quo keepers. Hence, neither the generational change that brings fresh socio-political ideas, nor technological breakthrough –which usually comes along – will successfully ever take place in future of such demographics.” (For a detailed demographic outlook and tentative recommendations/conclusions, see: Bajrektarevic, A. (2005), Our Common Futures: EURO-MED Human Capital beyond 2020, Crans Montana Forum, Monaco, 2005, as well as Bajrektarevic, A. (2005), Green/Policy Paper Submitted to the closing plenary of the Ministerial (Chairmanship summarizing the recommendations and conclusions of the OSCE Ministerial Summit Prague 2005), OSCE Documents EEA 2005.)

Eastern Europe is Hondurized – this term refers to an operationalization of Monroe Doctrine in Central America, by which Washington allows its strategic neighborhood to choose their own domestic political and economic systems to an acceptable degree, while the US maintains its final (hemispheric) say over their external orientation. The so-called Brezhnev doctrine (of irreversibility of communist gains) postulated the Soviet (Suslov-Stalin) equivalent to Honduras-ization – Finlandization.

Eastern Europe, the (under-)world of dramatic aging which is additionally demographically knocked down by the massive generational and brain drain. Passed the dismantling of the communist order, these emerging economies, countries in transition of the new Europe contain reactionary forces (often glorifying the wrong side of history), predatory ‘elites’ and masses of disillusioned (in a life without respect and dignity, humiliated and ridiculed in the triviality of their lasting decline). Even if the new jobs are created or old kept, they are in fact smoke screens: Mostly a (foreign-loans financed) state-sponsored poverty programs where armies of the underemployed and misemployed cry out miserable wages in dead-end jobs. Former Slovakian cabinet minister laments in private: ‘Our ‘liberated East’ lives on foreign loans, or in the best case as the industrial suburbia of West Europe, having these few ‘generously’ franchised factories like Renault, VW or Hugo Boss. Actually, these are just automotive assembly lines and tailor shops – something formally done only in the III World countries. Apart from the Russian Energia-Soyuz (space-program related) delivery system, what else do we have domestically created anywhere from Bratislava to Pacific? Is there any indigenous high-end technical product of past decades known? ... Our EU accession deals are worse than all Capitulation agreements combined that the Ottomans and Imperial China have ever signed in their history.”
that the NATO was and remains to be an instrument (institutionalized political justifier) of the US physical, military presence in Europe. Or, as Lord Ismay vocally defined it in 1949: ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’. The fact that the US remained in Western Germany, and that the Soviet Army pulled out from Eastern Germany did not mean ‘democratization’ or ‘transition’. It was a direct military defeat of the Gorbachev Russia in the duel over the core sectors of Central and Eastern Europe. As direct spoils of war, DDR disappeared from the political map of Europe being absorbed by Western Germany, while the American Army still resides in unified Germany. In fact, more than half of the US 75 major overseas military bases are situated in Europe. Up to this day, Germany hosts 25 of them.

Admittedly, by the early 1990s, the ‘security hole’ – Eastern Europe, has been approached in multifold fashion: Besides the (pre-Maastricht EC and post-Maastricht) EU and NATO, there was the Council of Europe, the CSCE (after the 1993 Budapest summit, OSCE), the EBRD and EIB. All of them were sending the political, economic, human dimension, commercial signals, assistance and expertise.36 These moves were making both sides very nervous; Russia becoming assertive (on its former peripheries) and Eastern Europe defiantly dismissive.37

Until this very day, each of them is portraying the NATO enterprise as the central security consideration: One as a must-go, and another as a no-go.38

No wonder that the absolute pivot of Eastern Europe – Ukraine, is a grand hostage of that very dilemma: Between the eastern pan-Slavic hegemony and western ‘imperialism of free market’.39 For Ukraine, Russia is a geographic, socio-historic, cultural and linguistic reality. These days, this reality is far less reflected upon than the seducing, but distant Euro-Atlantic club. Ukraine for

**Political science**

36 Through the EBRD-EIB conditionalities and EU accession criteria, Eastern Europe was dictated to practically dismantle its essential industrial and service base. This dictatum upon defeated belligerent – euphemistically called countries in transition or new Europe – was followed by loans and assets received from the EU Accession and Structural funds. It was ‘sold’ to the East as award and as such presented to the deceived population. (However, it was rather to tranquilize the population at large and to pacify their local scenes, not at all aimed to modernize, re-industrialize or diversify economy, or to make production and service sector more efficient or competitive. Consequently, it was merely to subsidize the deteriorating purchasing power of the East – to make the peoples there accustomed to and encouraged for the foreign goods and services.) Thus, the funds were predominately consumed for the western commodities. Ergo, Atlantic and Central Europe extended themselves geographically, while economically they skillfully managed to subsidize their own industrial base. To this very end, Eastern Europe’s elites readily took loans, while in return – laying down sovereignty in issuing the guaranties. By doing so, they indebted their own states beyond bearing, and hence, they finally eliminated their own countries as any current or future economic competitor or politico-military challenger.

37 Since the end of WWII, there was no other external military interventions but to the Europe’s East. To be accurate, in its long history (earlier and nearly double longer than of the Warsaw pact), the only two interventions of NATO ever conducted in Europe were both taking place solely on Eastern European soil. While the two Russian (covert) interventions aimed at its strategic neighborhood (former Soviet republics, heavily inhabited by ethnic Russian; Abkhazia-South Ossetia and Crimea-East Ukraine) and were (unsuccessfully) justified as the encirclement preemption, the US-led NATO intervened overtly. In both NATO cases (Bosnia and Serbia-Kosovo), it was well beyond any membership territory, and short of any UN-endorsed mandate, meaning without a real international legitimacy. “Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was never exactly what it appeared… It was a use of imperial power to support a self-determination claim by a national minority” – wrote Michael Ignatieff about the 1990s Balkans events, as fresh and accurate as if reporting was from Sevastopol in spring 2014.

38 It is anticipated that Iran (and Syria) on the Russian southwest flank serve as a pivotal security buffer. Indeed, Teheran is in constant need of a diplomatic cover from Moscow – as it internationally seeks, at least, a turn-key technology legalization for itself. In return, Iran refrains from its own Islamic projection on and it shields the Caucasus and Central Asia – considered by Russians as their strategic backyard – from the assertive Wahhabism. On the other hand, boldness of Iran endorses a perfect pretext for a reinforced missile shield. This – interestingly enough – rather encircles Russia then it deters Iran, as the recent architecting of the Missile shield predominantly to Eastern Europe (from the Baltics, Poland, Czech Republic and Romania) has showed. There are exceptionally few reinforced Patriot missile batteries (of adequate quantities and configurations) stationed e.g. in Turkey – the only NATO member of a close proximity, capable to engage Syria or Iran. Hence, while such a missile hype does not deter Iran (does not democratize Turkey, does not bring stability to Iraq, nor decentralizes West) – consider as an imperious pretext for the OSCE guarded politico-military/CSBM cooperation among the Organization’s 56 member states.

39 It is further burdened by the imperialism in a hurry – an inflammable mix of the Lithuanian-Polish past traumas and German ‘manifest destiny’ of being historically yet again ill-fated; impatient for quick results – simply, unable to capitalize on its previous successes. One of my German students recently very vividly ironized, “the irony of unintended consequence is that the intense relationship between Über-mutti (Chancellor Merkel) and boxman at large Klitschko is interpreted by Moscow as asexuat, but not as apolitical.” To say, overly cosmopolitan interest for a faith of foreigners living in Germany for someone who infamously said: “multiculturalism is dead in Europe…” (Sar-kozy, Cameron and Merkel openly and repeatedly viewed and diagnosed ‘death of multiculturalism’, as if the cluster of Atlantic-Central Europe’s national-states lived a long, cordial and credible history of multiculturalism on its soil.
Russia is more than a lame western-flank’ geopolitical pivot. For Moscow, Kiev is an emotional place – an indispensable bond of historio-civilizational attachment – something that makes and sustains Russia both Christian and European. Putin clearly redlined it: Sudden annexation of Crimea was an unpleasant and humiliating surprise that will bring a lot of foreign policy hangover for both the NATO and EU. Thus drifting chopped off and away, Ukraine itself is a prisoner of this domesticated security drama. This false dilemma so tragically imploded within this blue state, of a 50:50 polarized population, over the question where the country belongs – in space, time and side of history. Conclusively, Eastern Europe is further twisting, while gradually combusted between Ukrainization and Pakistanization.40

Least to the East and Nest of the West

The EU has secured itself on the southeastern flank, too. In the course of last few centuries, the Balkans was either influenced or controlled by Russia on the east (also by the Ottomans), Turkey on the south and center, Austria on the north and west, with the pockets of Anglo-French influence, too (Greece, Serbia, Albania). This reads that ever since the late XVII c. (precisely, from 1686 when Russia joined the Holy League, and past the subsequent 1699 Treaty of Karlovići), the peripheries kept center of the Balkans soft, as their own playground. The only (pre-modern and modern) period when the center was strong enough to prevail, marks the time of the Balkans’ Bismarck: Tito of Yugoslavia. Presently, the Eastern Balkans (Romania and Bulgaria) is cutoff from any Russian influence by being hastily admitted to the Union (2007). Turkey is contained by Greece (1980) and Cyprus (2004), and is waiting on the EU doorstep for decades without any clear prospect to join.41 All that, as if it follows the old rational of the 1814 Vienna Congress as well as the Bismarck’s dictatum to Andrassy at the 1878 Congress of Berlin. Reinvigorating these geo-economic and strategic imperatives, Austria does not hesitate to add and shed emotional charge: it is nearly neuralgic on the Turkish EU accession, Russian presence or inner Slavic strength. In an attempt to control the core sectors of the Balkans, Austria jealously keeps the highest post in the Office of High Representative for Bosnia in its hands.42 At the same time, it is the main protégé of Croatia’s bid for the EU membership (2013). De-industrialized, over-indebted and increasingly de-Slavicized, Croatia – for that matter of course, further fortifies the Austro-influence deeper in the Balkan proper.43

The rest of the Western Balkans is still finishing the dissolution of Yugoslavia, by forming the ever smaller, incapacitated mini nation-states. (The prevailing political culture of the Western Balkans is provincial, anti-European. There was another time when Europe claimed to have a comprehensive multilateral setting, while keeping two pivotal powers outside the system – interwar period. No wonder that the League of Nations did not prevent but, on contrary, only accelerated the pre-WWII events with its ‘system error’, (in)action and lack of outreach.42 Colloquially known as the Colonial Office, OHR (Office of the High Representative) is the (US military base induced, the 19th century Congress look alike) ‘internationally’ set body with the supreme (legislative) prerogatives and highest executive (political) powers in the country. This non-UN-, non-OSCE-, and non-EU mandated office is increasingly criticized for its shadowy influence and opaque decision-making. Since its inauguration in 1995, the post of the chief OHR executive – High Representative (nicknamed as Colonial Governor), is dominated by Atlantic-Central Europe – 6 out of 7 individuals. Although Austria itself is regularly criticized for its dismal score on protection of minorities, it managed – like no other state to get the top OHR post twice, and to stay in that office for already 9 out of 19 years. Moreover, as the first and only country ever under the EU sanctions (for inviting its far-right political party to the coalition government in 2000), Austria was strongly condemned by all EU member states, but not in Bosnia, where it continued to keep the post of the High Representative.

40 Ukrainization could be attributed to eastern and western Slavs – who are fighting distinctions without significant difference. Pakistnization itself should describe the southern Slavs’ scenery: In lieu of truth and reconciliation, guilt is offered as a control mechanism, following the period of an unchecked escalation, ranging from a hysteria-of-a-small-difference to a crime-of-otherness purge.

41 Why is the biggest and richest city of Europe (still) outside the Union? Does it illustrate a Huntingtonian fact that the EU is not as multi-religious multilateral system as its younger (twin) brother – ASEAN, but only a nest for the western Christian Um-mah? True, but not completely. The last spot of Europe with both economic and demographic growth is Turkey. Just one more European country also has a steady economic growth – Russia. Another commonality for them is that both are outside the system which portrays itself as a truly Europo-cosmopolitan and pan-...
intellectual, xenophobic, irresponsible anti-politics). Less than a decade after President Tito’s death, the tectonic changes in the Eastern bloc have caused the dramatic change of geopolitical position of Yugoslavia and the NAM. The external players and local élites, whom they chose to boost and cooperate with, had silently agreed that for the amortization of revived Anglo-French, Germanophone, Russian and Turkish (traditional), and the US (non-traditional) projections on the region, the Southern Slavs should (de-industrialize, de-Slavicize, and) live in far more than two states. In the absence of compromise among the major external geopolitical projectors, the region still undergoes the fragmentational erosion, being kept (like once upon a time Germany) as a soft center for strong peripheral pressures.44 Bosnia is the best example of such an external intrusion, and of the powers that purposely set a dysfunctional government.45 Although assertive, none of the Four + the US wants to prevail in this core sector of the Balkans (and solely take a burden), but wish to keep its presence strong enough as to observe and deter others.

Nevertheless, ever since the Antique Roman times, the Southern Slavs territories (even all of the Balkans) have always existed within the larger multinational entities (be it Byzantium, Hungary, the Ottomans, the Habsburg Empire or Yugoslavia) – hardly ever in more than two states. Accommodation to a life in the numerous nano nation-state-likes is a historical novelty, therefore only a transitory stage of the Western Balkans.46 The lasting solution will only appear with the return to a historical legacy – life in a larger, multinational entity.

In his luminary work ‘The New Asian Hemisphere’, Mahbubani accurately concludes that Gorbachev – not understanding the real success of Western strength and power, handed over the Soviet empire and got nothing in return.47 Is our history directional or conceivable, dialectic or cyclical? The Soviet Union was far more of a classic continental military empire (overtly brutal; rigid, anti-individual, omnipresent, secretive), while the US was more a finan-cial empire (covertly brutal; hierarchical, yet asocial, exploitive, pervasive, polarizing). Bear of permafrost vs. fish of the warm seas. Athens vs. Sparta. Phoenicia vs. Rome. Thus, Soviets went bankrupt by mid 1980s. So did the Americans (the ‘white man burden’ fractured them already by the Vietnam war, with the Nixon shock only officializing it), but the United States managed its financial capital (or an illusion of it) insofar as to be(come) a debtor empire through the Wall Street guaranties.48

called Dayton Peace Accord, and further on strongly encouraged and supported in everyday practice for nearly two decades. It is clear that any conceptual, therefore inclusive politics, would sooner or later end up in a reconciliatory, integrative approach. Perpetuating the anti-politics in Bosnia aims at keeping the former Yugoslav (political, cultural, economic and territorial) space separated, antagonized – fragmented into little xenophobic and inward-looking quasi nation-states. Moreover, as the only surviving (last) state of the multiethnic constituency anywhere from Adriatic to Pacific, Bosnia has to remain purposely dysfunctional. Slavs elsewhere have to be painfully reminded that a single-ethnos based, nano-to-small sized nation-state is the best option for them.

The difference between Russia and the Soviet Union is that the Federation desperately looks around for respect, but leaves the world responsibilities solely to the US. As known, admiration and respect is earned not given for free. “Clearly, the post-Soviet Russia avoids any strategic global competition with the US, but feels rather insulted with the current strategic global partnership – as both the US and China treat Moscow as a junior partner. Is it possible to (re-)gain a universal respect without any ideological appeal? That could be debated, but one thing is certain, even the mid-size powers such as Brazil, Indonesia or Turkey have moved on from a bandwagoning, reactive and slow to a proactive, accurate and extensive foreign policy.

How was a debtor empire born? One of the biggest (nearly schizophrenic) dilemmas of liberalism, ever since David Hume and Adam Smith, was an insight into reality; whether the world is essentially Hobbesian or Kantian. The state will rob you, but in absence of it, the pauperized masses will mob you. The invisible hand of Smith’s followers have found the satisfactory answer – sovereign debt: relatively strong government of the state (heavily) indebted (firstly to local merchants, than to foreigners). With such a mixed blessing no empire can easily demonetize its legitimacy.
vs. gold mine of printed paper. Nothing epitomizes this better than the words of the longest serving US Federal Reserve’s boss, Greenspan, who famously said to then French President Chirac: “Indeed, dollar is our currency, but your problem”. Hegemony vs. hegemony.

This very nature of power explains why the Americans have missed to take the mankind into completely other direction, towards the non-confrontational, decarbonized, de-monetized/de-financialized and de-psychologized, the self-realizing humankind. They had such a chance when, past the Gorbachev’s unconditional surrender of the Soviet bloc, the US – unconstrained as a ‘lonely superpower’ – solely dictated terms of reference.\(^49\) Sadly enough, that was not the first missed opportunity for the US. The very epilogue of the WWII meant a full security guaranty for the US: Geo-economically – 52% of anything manufactured in the world was carrying a label Made in USA, and geostrategically – the US had uninterruptedly enjoyed nearly a decade of the ‘nuclear monopoly’. Up to this very day, the US scores the biggest number of N-tests conducted, the largest stockpile of nuclear weaponry, and it represents the only power ever deploying this ‘ultimate weapon’ on other nation. To complete the irony, Americans enjoy geographic advantage like no other empire ever. Save the US, as Ikenberry vividly notes: “every major power in the world lives in a crowded geopolitical neighborhood where shifts in power routinely provoke counter-balancing...”\(^50\) The US neighbors are oceans.

Indeed, no successful empire does rely merely on coercion, be it abroad or at home. However, unable to escape its inner logics and deeply-rooted appeal of confrontational nostalgia, the prevailing archival is only a winner, rarely a game-changer.\(^51\) So, to the above asked question whether our history is dialectic or cyclical, the current Ukrainian events are like a bad-taste déjá vu.

‘End of the Cold War’ – such a buzz word, of a diametrically different meaning. East would interpret it as the final end of confrontation, while the Westerners have no such an illusion. To them it is the end of war, which only came after the unconditional surrender of East. Another powerful evidence to support our claim: Just 20 years ago, distance between Moscow and NATO troops stationed in Central Europe (e.g. Berlin) was over 1.600 km. Today, it is only 120 km from St. Petersburg.\(^52\) Realities have dramatically changed for the Atlantic-Central Europe and for Russia, while for Eastern Europe much remains the same – East still serves others as a strategic depth.\(^53\)

In short, Atlantic Europe is a political powerhouse, with two of 3 European nuclear powers and 2 out of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, P–5. Central Europe is an economic powerhouse, Russophone Europe is an energy powerhouse, Scandinavian Europe is all of that a bit, and Eastern Europe is none of it.\(^54\)

49 One of the biggest ideological victories of the US is the fact that only two decades years after the Soviet collapse, Russia today has an economy, dominated by oil-rich class of billionaires, whose assets are 20% of country’s GDP –by far the largest share held by the ultra-rich in any major economy. The second largest ideological victory for the US is reported by the New York Times that the outgoing leader of the country that officially rests on ideology of oppressed working class has allegedly accumulated family wealth of 1.7 billion in less than a decade of his rule. Some in the US are not that happy about it, and are wondering – like Fukuyama in his luminary essay – “where is a counter-narrative?” To ease the pain for all balance-seekers: Even if the ideological triumph of the US might be a clear cut, geopolitically it remains undecided. While Russians were absorbing the shock of loss of their historical empire, the ‘lonely superpower’ didn’t know what to do with its colossal gain.

50 Ikenberry, G.J. (2014), The Illusion of Geopolitics, Foreign Affairs Magazine 93(3) 2014

51 There are many who would claim that the West was unable to capitalize on the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that the
From WWI to www. 9/11 or 11/9?

For most of our history both progress as well as its (horizontal) transmission was extremely slow and tedious a process. Well to the classic period of Alexander the Macedonian and his glorious Alexandrian library, the speed of our transmissions –however moderate– was still always surpassing cycles of our breakthroughs. When the breakthroughs finally turned to be faster than the speed of their transmissions – that was a point of our departure. Simply, our civilizations started to significantly differentiate from each other in their respective techno-agrarian, politico-military, ethno-religious, ideological and economic set-ups. In the eve of grand discoveries, that very event transformed wars and famine from the low-impact and local into the bigger and colossal. Faster cycles of technological breakthroughs, patents and discoveries than their own transmission, primarily occurred on the old continent. That event marked a birth of mighty European empires and their (liberal) schools of applied biologism, racism, genocide, organized plunders, ethno-social engineering and eugenics, and similar forms of ideological justifiers. For the past few centuries, we lived fear but dreamt hope – all for the sake of modern times. From WWI to www. Is this modernity of internet age, with all sufficiently fast cycles of technological transmission, now harboring us in a bay of fairness, harmony and overall reconciliation?  

yards ever since Poland (eager, but without careful preparations have) opened its EU accession talks… The similar termination of all public subsidies is stipulated in chapter 8 (Competition Policy) of the accession treaty admitting Croatia to the EU, and the European Commission has been closely monitoring the implementation of the ‘restructuring’ program for the Croatian shipyards. This ongoing shipyards demise will complete Croatia’s de-industrialization (adding to the already record high unemployment of some 25% in the coastal areas). All over the globe, states assist shipbuilding as it is a formidable job provider: In Italy, the Fincantieri shipyards are entirely in public hands; in France, the state is still a minority shareholder in the biggest yards such as STX-Chantiers de l’Atlantique. Even in South Korea, the world champion in naval construction, the state subsidizes shipbuilding. Seems that all what is globally acceptable is forbidden in Eastern Europe; all the way from Poland to Croatia, in the name of European integration.  

At this point, let me allow myself a little story in bracket. It is not to romanticise the past but to note on an erosion of one very important governmental post, which is a key for daily execution of international relations… By my free account, in 1815 at the time of Vienna Congress, there are not more than 50 ambassadors worldwide. By the Berlin Congress, their number is still well below 100. Each and every one of them is an exceptional individual of the high moral grounds, of a deep passion affection and loyalty, of an excellent professional standing. Well-mannered and well-informed, erudites, thinkers of paramount analytical insights, charismatic charming and highly intelligent, they represented intellectual creme de la creme of that time societies. By the 1945 San Francisco Conference, the world already counts several hundreds of active ambassadors. At present, there are some 25–30,000 individuals with this title (20–25,000 active national, and some 5–8,000 retired national, as well as up to 1,000 paradiplomats of ambassadorial ranks serving IOs). Sadly enough, in more than a few cases, this post is obtained today by persons who are simply career opportunists, without sufficient professional or moral merits to hold ambassadorial position (individuals who just climbed their careers by being yes-men, no-action-no-mistake-stance grey apparatchiks, disloyal bed mannered and ill-informed but well webbed-up in either nepotistic or crony networks, political removals, rich individuals who bought the post much like the car is purchased). In this gradual but total erosion of ambassadorship, something still remains firm and stable: privileges, immunities and of course a paycheque /Source on figures: author’s free account./  

In late spring 2011 Chancellor Merkel has surprisingly but repeatedly and firmly promised to her fellow Germans the closing of all national nuclear plants. Mixing it with the growth and stability move, many applauded to this heated political rhetoric, as a long-waited and badly needed plan for the High/Green Tech renewal of the EU. Adding a flavor of emotional charge to it, most analysts have interpreted the Chancellor’s bold word of promise with the safety concerns related to that time brewing Japanese Fukushima drama, as if Germany shared Japan’s geography, restraining the one-time, head-hunting punitive action. This time, both Libya and Syria (Iraq, Mali, Ukraine, too) have been given a different attachment: The considerable presence of China in Africa; successful pipeline deals between Russia and Germany (which, while circumventing Eastern Europe, will deprive it from any transit-related bargaining premium, and will tacitly pose an effective joint Russo-German pressure on the Baltic states, Poland and Ukraine), and finally relative decline of the
This is to understand that although seemingly unified, Europe is essentially composed of several segments, each of them with its own dynamics, legacies and its own political culture (considerations, priorities and anxieties): Atlantic and Central Europe confident and secure on the one end, and (the EU and non-EU) Eastern Europe as well as Russia on the other end, insecure and neuralgic, therefore, in a permanent quest for additional security guarantees.

"America did not change on September 11. It only became more itself" – Robert Kagan famously claimed. Paraphrasing it, we may say: From 9/11 (09th November 1989 in Berlin) and shortly after, followed by the genocidal wars all over Yugoslavia, up to the Euro, MENA or ongoing Ukrainian crisis, Europe didn’t change. It only became more itself – a conglomerate of five different Europes.

Post Scriptum

How can we observe and interpret (the distance between) success and failure from a historical perspective? This question remains a difficult one to (satisfy all with a single) answer.. The immediate force behind the rapid and successful European overseas projection was actually the two elements combined: Europe’s technological (economic) and demographic expansion (from early 16th century on). However, West/Europe was not – frankly speaking – winning over the rest of this planet by the superiority of its views and ideas, by purity of its virtues or by clarity of its religious thoughts and practices. For a small and rather insecure civilization, it was just the superiority and efficiency in applying the ratio-

poses in effect a joint Russo-German pressure on the Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine, and even as far as Azerbaijan and Georgia.

57 In response to the MENA crisis, Europe failed to keep up a broad agenda and all-participatory basis with its strategic neighborhood, although having institutions, interest and credibility to do so. Europe compromised its own perspectives and discredited its own transformative powers’ principle by undermining the indigenous and authentic institutional framework: Barcelona Process (EU), the Euro-Med (OSCE). The only direct involvement was a military engagement via the Atlantic Europe-led coalition of the willing (Libya, Mali, Syria). The consequences are striking: The sort of Islam that the EU supported (and the means deployed to do so) in the Middle East yesterday, is the sort of Islam (and the means it uses) that Europe gets today. No wonder that Islam in Turkey (or in Kirgistan and in Indonesia) is broad, liberal and tolerant while the one of the Northern Europe is dismissive, narrow and assertive.

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